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INTRODUCTION
The Post Conviction Relief Act1 provides a
2
remedy for defendants in custody whose conviction or sentence resulted from one or more3
of the Act's specifically enumerated errors
4
and the claimed error has not been waived or
5
to
amendments
previously litigated. The 1995
the PCRA limited the availability of relief by
requiring that, subject to several narrow exceptions, a post conviction petition be filed within
one-year of the date the defendant's judgment
becomes final. 6 This article reports on recent

* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law
of the Pennsylvania State University. This article is
based upon remarks given at the Mid-Annual Trial
Judges Meeting, February 26, 2000.
142 Pa.C.S. §§9541 et seq.
2 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(1).
3 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(2).
4 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(3); 42 Pa.C.S. §9544(b).
5 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(3); 42 Pa.C.S. §9544(a).
6

42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b).

amendments and proposed amendments to
the Rules of Criminal Procedure governing
post conviction relief' and summarizes recent
significant decisions of the Pennsylvania
Supreme and Superior Courts construing provisions of the Act, including a number of decisions interpreting the Act's one-year filing
period.
AMENDMENTS AND PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULE GOVERNING
CAPITAL CASES
A significant amendment to Pa.R.Crim.P.
1504 dealing with the appointment of counsel
in capital cases will become effective July 1,
2000.8 The amendment adds new paragraph
(F) to the Rule. As amended, the Rule requires
that at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the United States
Supreme Court or the time for taking such
review, the record in the case shall be
remanded to the trial court and the trial court
shall appoint new counsel for the purpose of
post conviction collateral review. Under the
Rule, new counsel will not be appointed if the
defendant waives PCRA review, or elects to
proceed pro se and the court finds in both
cases, after an on the record colloquy, that the
defendant is competent and the election is
knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Further,
counsel will not be appointed if the defendant
requests continued representation by original
trial or direct appeal counsel, and the court
finds, again following an on the record colloquy, that the defendant's election constitutes a
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of
claims that trial or appellate counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally,

7 Pa.R.Crim.P. 1501-1510.
8 In Re: Order Adopting Amendments to Rule of
Criminal Procedure 1504 and approving revision of
Comments to Rules of Criminal Procedure 1502,
1503 & 1506, No. 259 Jan. 21, 2000.
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counsel will not be appointed if the court finds
that the defendant has engaged counsel who
will enter his or her appearance for the purposes of PCRA review. Under the Rule, the
appointment of counsel will be effective
throughout the post conviction proceeding
and including an appeal from the disposition
of the petition.
While prompt appointment of counsel in
death penalty cases will likely result in the filing of a petition well in advance of the oneyear deadline 9 for seeking PCRA relief thereby
eliminating some delay in the resolution of
capital cases, the amended Rule appears to
conflict with Section 9545(a) of the Act. 10
Section 9545(a) provides that no court shall
have authority to entertain a request for any
form of relief in anticipation of the filing of the
petition. The amended Rule requires the trial
court to act even though, in the usual case,
there will be no petition pending at the time of
the proceeding required by the Rule.
An additional question concerns the defendant's decision to continue to be represented
by prior trial or direct appeal counsel.
Assuming a defendant can make a knowing
and intelligent waiver of possible claims of
ineffectiveness of prior counsel, the required
colloquy under the Rule would, at a minimum, need to inform the defendant that
because of the waiver provision of the Act,"
waiving claims of ineffectiveness of counsel
would mean that with the exception of the
claims of newly discovered exculpatory evidence, 12 a lack of jurisdiction,' 3 imposition of
an illegal sentence 14 and obstruction by government officials of the right to appeal,' 5 the
defendant would be precluded from obtaining
post conviction relief because all other claims
would be considered waived.
The other change effective July 1, 2000 concerns stays of execution."6 Rule 1509 as

amended provides that the request for a stay
should be included in the PCRA petition,
although failure to include the request in the
petition does not constitute a waiver of the
right to seek a stay. The amended Rule provides that when a stay is granted, it will
remain in effect through the conclusion of the
PCRA proceeding, including review in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The Criminal Procedure Rules Committee is
planning to recommend that the Supreme
Court amend Rule 1509 governing capital
cases.17 The Rule presently requires that the
judge, no later than 90 days from the notice to
dismiss 18 or from oral argument, to (1) dismiss
the petition, (2) grant the defendant leave to
file an amended petition, or (3) order an evidentiary hearing. 19 In addition, the Rule as
presently written requires the judge, subject to
the imposition of sanctions, to reach a decision
on the petition no more than 90 days after the
evidentiary hearing. 2" Under the proposed
change, the 90 day periods are subject to a single 30 day extension. In addition, the proposed
amendment removes the threat of sanctions for
failure to comply with required 90 day periods
and replaces sanctions with a mechanism by
which the clerk of courts notifies the judge that
the time limits have expired. If the judge fails
to act within 30 days of the clerk's notice, the
clerk would be required to send a notice of
non-compliance to the Supreme Court.
RECENT CASES INTERPRETING THE PCRA
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As noted, claims otherwise cognizable
under the Act 2' are deemed waived if the
claim could have been raised before, or at trial,
or on appeal. 22 To avoid waiver, a petitioner
must allege that the claim or claims would
have been presented in a prior proceeding but

17 29 Pa. Bulletin 6462 (Dec. 25, 1999); 30 Pa.
Bulletin - (May 27, 2000.
18 In a recent case, Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749
1142 Pa.C.S. §9544(b). Properly layered claims of A.2d 911 (Pa. 2000), the Supreme Court refused to
ineffective assistance of counsel permit a PCRA provide the defendant with relief where the PCRA
court to consider claims that would otherwise be court dismissed the defendant's petition without the
considered waived. Commonwealth v. Allen, 732 notice required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 1509 (C)(1) because
A.2d 582, 587 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Pursell, the court concluded that the defendant had failed to
invoke the jurisdiction of the PCRA court by failing
724 A.2d 293, 302 (Pa. 1999).
12 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(2)(iv).
to plead and prove one or more of the exceptions to
13 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(2)(viii). See Commonwealth
the one year filing period contained in 42 Pa.C.S.
v. Quinlan, 639 A.2d 1235, 1238 (Pa. Super. 1994).
§9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
19 Pa.R.Crim.P. 1509(c).
14 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(2)(vii). See Commonwealth
20 Pa.R.Crim.P. 1509(c)(3).
v. Williams, 660 A.2d 614, 618 (Pa. Super. 1995).
21 724 A.2d 326 (Pa. 1999).
15 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(2)(iv).

9 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b).
10 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(a).

16

42 Pa.C.S. §9545(c).

22 658

A.2d 771 (Pa. 1995).
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for counsel's ineffectiveness. 23 In a number of
recent decisions, the Supreme and Superior
Courts have addressed the standard for determining ineffectiveness presented in a post
conviction petition and whether a defendant
has a remedy under the Act when counsel's
error occurs after the trial in the matter.
Standard Governing Ineffectiveness Claims
In Commonwealth v. Kimball,24 the Supreme Court returned to an issue that had
sharply divided the Court in Commonwealth
v. Buehl.25 The question presented in both
cases was whether the provision of the Act
governing ineffectiveness of counsel requires
the defendant to meet a more stringent standard for ineffectiveness than the standard that
governs when the issue is presented on direct
appeal. At issue was the meaning of the language in §9543(a)(2)(ii) of the Act that requires
a defendant claiming ineffectiveness to prove
that counsel's act or omission "so undermined
the truth determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have
taken place." 26 Buehl involved counsel's failure to request a cautionary instruction. The
plurality in Buehl concluded that, although
the outcome of Buehl's case may have been
different had counsel requested the cautionary
instruction, Buehl was not entitled to PCRA
relief because of the overwhelming evidence
of his guilt. 27 According to the plurality in
Buehl, it was not sufficient for a defendant
seeking PCRA relief to show that there was a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
error, the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different. Rather, a more stringent
standard of ineffectiveness governed when
was presented in a PCRA
ineffectiveness
28
petition.
In Kimball, the Supreme Court held that
there is a unitary standard in Pennsylvania for
evaluating claims of ineffectiveness of counsel.29 The court concluded that the language in
the PCRA closely tracks the language the
United States Supreme Court used in

Strickland v. Washington,30 the case defining
ineffectiveness under the federal constitution.
Ineffectiveness of counsel under Strickland,
Kimball held, requires what a defendant alleging ineffectiveness under the PCRA must
establish: acts or omissions by counsel that
undermine the reliability of the adjudication
of guilt. 31 The court held that reliability of the
adjudication of guilt and the probability that
counsel's ineffectiveness caused a different
outcome were concepts so closely intertwined
and commonly rooted in Strickland that it
refused to separate them. Kimball holds that
the standard for determining ineffectiveness
set in Commonwealth v. Pierce32 governs
whether ineffectiveness is raised on direct
appeal or presented in a post conviction
petition.
Penalty Phase Claims Cognizable in PCRA
Proceeding
In Commonwealth v. Chester,3 3 the Supreme
Court held that because the penalty phase
hearing of a capital case involves the presentation of evidence and a determination of facts
pursuant to the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, it is a "truth determining process"
within the meaning of Sections 9543(a)(2)(i)
and (a)(2)(ii) Post Conviction Relief Act.
Capital cases, the court concluded, simply present "another facet of the common understanding of 'guilt or innocence. ' ' ' 34 The court
held that its holding that penalty phase issues
are within the scope of the PCRA is consistent
with the court's practice since the repeal of the
PCHA and the enactment of the PCRA in
198835 of reviewing ineffectiveness of counsel
and constitutional claims arising during the
penalty phase. The court noted the fact that
the legislature did not amend the PCRA in
1995 to exclude penalty phase issues evidenced a presumption that the court's interpretation of the statutory language in the' 36Act
"is in accordance with legislative intent.
Ineffectiveness and a Defendant's Right to
Direct Appeal
In Commonwealth v. Lantzy,3 7 the Supreme
Court considered the issue of whether lawyer

23 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(2)(ii). See e.g., Commonwealth v. Allen, 732 A.2d 582, 587 (Pa. 1999).
([Wiaiver of previously unlitigated issue is excused
...where the petitioner can demonstrate that his
trial or appellate counsel was ineffective.")
24 724 A.2d 326 (Pa. 1999).
25 658 A.2d 771 (Pa. 1995).
26 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(2)(ii).
27 Commonwealth v. Buehl, 658 A.2d at 782.
28 Id. at 777.
29 Commonwealth v. KImball, 724 A.2d at 333.

30 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

31 Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d at 332.
32 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987).
33 733 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1999).
34 733 A.2d at 1249.
35 Act of April 13, 1988 (P.L. 336, No. 47).
36 733 A.2d at 1250.
37 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999).
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error in failing to perfect a direct appeal implicates the "truth determining process" thereby
entitling a defendant to PCRA relief. Lawyer
error during the appeal process was initially
considered by the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Tanner.38 Tanner concerned appellate counsel's failure to inform the defendant
of his right to seek discretionary review in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Superior
Court denied PCRA relief on the grounds that
counsel's claimed ineffectiveness did not bear
on the defendant's ultimate guilt or innocence
and, therefore, did not implicate "the truth
determining process"3 9 under the Act.
When the Superior Court considered lawyer
error in the context of direct appeal in
Lantzy,40 the court affirmed the denial of
PCRA relief basing its decision on its earlier
41
holding in Commonwealth v. Petroski'.
In
Petroski,the court relying upon its decision in
Tanner,had held that lawyer error in failing to
protect a defendant's right to direct appeal did
not entitle a defendant to post conviction relief
because the "truth-determining process" occurs
during trial and not on appeal. Seeking to clarify Petroski, the Superior Court in Lantzy held
that a defendant was entitled to PCRA relief
where counsel failed to file an appeal if he
could establish that he was innocent or that
his sentence was illegal. Otherwise, a defendant could seek relief outside the PCRA by
requesting an appeal nunc pro tunc.
In reversing the Superior Court, the
Supreme Court in Lantzy held that the PCRA
provides the "exclusive remedy where a
defendant seeks the restoration of appeal
rights due to counsel's failure to perfect a
direct appeal. 42 The court stated that a narrow
interpretation of the PCRA to apply only to
lawyer error at trial would lead to a bifurcated
system of review where some claims, considered outside the PCRA, would be subject to
habeas corpus review. The court concluded
that the legislature intended the PCRA to be
"the sole means" 43 for obtaining collateral
relief The court held that prejudice is presumed when there is an actual or constructive
denial of counsel. Consequently, where counsel disregards a defendant's request to file a
direct appeal, the defendant is entitled to

600 A.2d 201 (Pa. Super. 1991).
Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(2)(ii).
40 712 A.2d 288 (Pa. Super. 1998).
41695 A.2d 844 (Pa. Super. 1997).
42 Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 570.
43Id. fn. 4. 42 Pa.C.S. §9542.

PCRA relief without establishing either innocence or demonstrating the merits of the issues
that would have been
raised had the appeal
44
been filed on time.
In Commonwealth v. Knighten,45 a postLantzy case, the Superior Court held the trial
court's determination that trial counsel was
not ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal
did not preclude the defendant from pursuing
a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
in a PCRA. A claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is properly preserved if it is raised at
the first opportunity that the defendant is represented by new counsel. If there is no intervening substitution of counsel, the court held
that there is no waiver of a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel by virtue of the failure to raise the claim on direct appeal. Where
the court determines that counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal, all
issues other than the allegation of ineffectiveness of trial counsel are waived.
In a second post-Lantzy case, the Superior
Court in Commonwealth v. Prisk46 held that
although the trial court informed the defendant of his appeal rights at the time of sentence, this fact did not excuse counsel's failure
to pursue an appeal where requested to do so
by the defendant. While subsequent reinstatement of defendant's appeal right may be made
where there has been an unjustified failure of
counsel to perfect a direct appeal, where the
trial court has held an evidentiary hearing on
all issues raised in the PCRA petition, the
Superior Court will grant the defendant a new
trial if the defendant establishes on appeal
from the denial of PCRA relief that counsel
was ineffective with respect to claims in addition to counsel's failure to pursue a direct
appeal.
Right to Effective Post Conviction Counsel
In Commonwealth v. Albrecht,47 the
Supreme Court considered whether a defendant has a cognizable claim for acts or omissions by post conviction counsel. The court
held that, notwithstanding the fact that the
defendant in a PCRA case does not have a right
to counsel based on either the federal or state
constitution, the appointment of counsel pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1504 carries with it an
enforceable right to effective assistance of

38

39 42

44 Id. at 572.
45 742 A.2d 679 (Pa. Super. 1999).
48 744 A.2d 294 (Pa. Super. 1999).
47 720 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1998).
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counsel. The standard, the court held, that
governs ineffectiveness claims at trial and on
direct appeal applies to claims of ineffectiveness of post conviction counsel. The court
noted where a defendant is represented by
new counsel on appeal from the denial of post
conviction relief and claims that post conviction counsel failed to raise particular claims in
the PCRA court, an appellate court will grant
relief without remanding the case where the
defendant establishes that post conviction
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Although not noted by the court in Albrecht,
where the defendant is not represented on
appeal from the denial of PCRA relief by new
counsel but instead by counsel who represented the defendant before the PCRA court,
the appellate court will generally not have
before it a claim of ineffectiveness of post conviction counsel because counsel cannot be
expected to raise his own ineffectiveness as
part of the appeal from the denial of PCRA
relief.48 As a result, the issue of PCRA's counsel's ineffectiveness
will need be presented in
49
a second petition.

court stated, exists as an independent basis for
relief only in cases where a claim is not cognizable under the PCRA.
Where a petition is untimely, petitioner has
the burden to plead in the petition and prove
that one of the exceptions to one-year filing
period apply. 54 In Commonwealth v. Yarris,55
the Supreme Court held that since the issue of
timeliness implicates the jurisdiction of the
court, a court may consider the matter sua
sponte.
The Superior Court has held that appointment of counsel is required even though the
petition does not appear to have been timely

Time for FilingPCRA Petition

interference

The 1995 amendments to the PCRA require
that a petition, subject to a number of exceptions, be filed within one year of the date a
judgment becomes final.50 The exceptions
themselves are subject to a 60-day period. 51 In
Commonwealth v. Fahy,52 the Supreme Court
held that the time limits mandated by the 1995
amendments are jurisdictional and, therefore,
the period for filing is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling, except to the extent
that the doctrine is reflected in the statutory
exceptions to the filing period. The court
stated that a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel does not save an otherwise untimely PCRA
petition, nor can a court consider a challenge
to the legality of a sentence if the petition is
not timely filed or falls under one of the exceptions to the time period.5 3 Habeas corpus, the

48 Counsel is not precluded from raising his or her
own ineffectiveness on appeal. See generally Com-

monwealth v. Green, 709 A.2d 382, 384 (Pa. 1998).

49 See Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585 (Pa.

2000) for a discussion of second petitions and the
time-for-filing provisions under the Act.
50 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b).

51 42 Pa.C.S. §954503)(1)(i)-(iii).
52 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999).
53 737 A.2d at 223.

filed. In Commonwealth v. Ferguson,56 the

court stated that before a PCRA court dismisses an initial petition as untimely, it must
determine if the defendant is indigent and, if
so, appoint counsel pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.

1504 for purposes of counsel determining
whether the petition is timely, and if not,
whether any of the exceptions to the one-year
filing period apply in the case.
While the Act permits a PCRA court to consider an untimely petition if the defendant
establishes that the failure to raise the claim
within the one-year period was the "result of
by government officials," 5 7 the
58

Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Yarris,
has held that a claim that ineffectiveness of
prior counsel prevented the defendant from
raising the present claim in a timely manner
does not meet the exception due to the specific
provision in the Act 5 9 that the term "government officials" does not include defense counsel. 60 The court has also held that the exception does not apply to a claim involving the
withdrawal of counsel and the PCRA's court's
refusal to appoint defendant new counsel on
his appeal from the denial of PCRA relief. 61 In
Commonwealth v. Pursell,6 2 the court rejected

a claim concerning PCRA's counsel's compliance with the procedures governing with-

54 Commonwealth v. Beasley, 741 A.2d 1258 (Pa.
1999).
95 731 A.2d 581, 587 (Pa. 1999).
56722 A.2d 177 (Pa. Super. 1998). See also Commonwealth v. Guthrie, 749 A.2d 502 (Pa. Super.
2000).
57 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b)(1)(i).
51 731 A.2d 581 (Pa. 1999).
5942 Pa.C.S. §9545(b)(4).
60 See also Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d
911 (Pa. 2000).
61Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911 (Pa.
2000).
62Id.
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drawal by counsel set out in Commonwealth v.
Turner.63 The court held the PCRA court's
decision not to appoint new counsel did not
constitute governmental interference with the
presentation of defendant's claim as both
issues could have been presented on appeal
from the denial of PCRA relief
The Supreme Court has described the second exception to the one-year filing period in
Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) which permits an
untimely claim when the "facts upon which
the claim is predicated were unknown to the
petitioner and could not have been ascertained
by the exercise of due diligence," as an exception for after discovered evidence.6 4 The
exception, the court has held, does not apply
where the defendant merely claims that "more
competent counsel would have presented other
claims based upon a better evaluation of the
facts available to ...at the time of trial .... 65
In Commonwealth v. Lark,66 the Supreme
Court held when a defendant's PCRA appeal is
pending before a court, a second or subsequent
PCRA petition cannot be filed until review has
been completed by the highest state court in
which review is sought or upon expiration of
the time for seeking such review. If the second
or subsequent petition is not filed within the
required one-year period of the date the judgment became final, the defendant must plead
and prove that the one of the three exceptions
to one-year filing apply. 67 Such a petition must
be filed within 60 days of the date of the order
which resolves the previous PCRA petition.

In Commonwealth v. Williams, 70 the court
held that in a capital PCRA case where the
defendant seeks discovery pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 1502(e)(2), the defendant must
establish specific grounds that warrant the
request for discovery. The court upheld the
lower court's denial of the request for discovery where the defendant provided no explanation as to why the documents that were
provided to former counsel by the Commonwealth were not available to post conviction
counsel, nor did the defendant attempt to
identify specific documents that71were not produced during pretrial or at trial.

Waiver of Claims

Standing to File PCRA -

As noted, the Act precludes post conviction
review for claims that could have been raised
at trial, on appeal or in a prior PCRA petition.6 8
In Commonwealth v. Albrecht,69 the Supreme
Court held that its practice of relaxing waiver
on direct appeal in capital cases would no
longer apply in appeals from the denial of
PCRA relief in capital cases. The court stated
that while relaxation of the waiver principle
on direct appeal was justified on grounds of
judicial economy because it reduces the need

In two recent cases, the Supreme Court has
addressed the issue of a next of friend seeking
post conviction relief on behalf of a defendant
who has waived PCRA review. In Commonwealth v. Bronshtein,72 the court held that a
person seeking PCRA relief on behalf of a
defendant as his next friend must first provide
the court an explanation as to why the defendant is unable to appear in his behalf and litigate his own cause. In addition, the putative
next friend must establish that he or she has a
significant relationship to and is truly dedicated to the best interests of the defendant.
Where the PCRA court determines that the
defendant has made a knowing and intelligent
decision not to pursue PCRA relief, the next of

for defendants to pursue issues in a post conviction proceeding, its application to post conviction appeals was not consistent with the
principle of finality and the efficient use of the
court's time. The court was satisfied that there
were adequate safeguards in capital cases in
light of the fact that a defendant can obtain
review of meritorious claims not raised by trial
counsel if raised by appellate counsel and
claims overlooked by appellate counsel can be
reviewed in a post conviction proceeding if
the defendant asserts the ineffectiveness of all
prior counsel. Consequently, the court held
that waiver will be excused in a PCRA appeal
only upon a demonstration of ineffectiveness
of counsel in not raising the issue in a prior
proceeding.
Discoveryin Capital Case

Next Friend Status

63544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988).
64 Commonwealth v. Yarns, 731 A.2d 581 (Pa.
1999).

65 Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911 Pa.

2000).
66 746 A.2d 585 (Pa. 2000).
67 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
66 42 Pa.C.S. §9544(b).
69 720 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1998).

70 732 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1999).

71 See also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720
A.2d 798 (Pa. 1998).
72 729 A.2d 1102 (Pa. 1999).
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friend does not have standing to pursue relief
waived by the defendant. In Commonwealth v.
White, 73 the court held that where a putative
next friend raises the issue of the competency
of the defendant to be executed, the next
friend must set forth specific reasons he or she
believes the defendant does not comprehend
the penalty. Where the defendant has waived
direct or collateral review and the court determines he or she was competent to do so, the
court may require a more significant showing in the nature of changed circumstances
before scheduling a hearing on the claim of
incompetency.
Petition to Withdraw from PCRA Proceeding
In Commonwealth v. Porter,74 the Supreme
Court considered counsel's obligation under
Commonwealth v. Turner75 in seeking to withdraw as appointed counsel in a PCRA proceeding. The Court held that counsel is not
required to conduct an extra record investigation of each claim defendant wishes to have
reviewed. Where there is nothing in the record
to support the claim, and there is no indication
that an investigation would be fruitful, counsel's decision not to investigate is reasonable.
Failureto Inform Defendant Regarding
Consecutive Sentences
When the issue is raised in a second or subsequent petition, the Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Allen 76 held that a trial
court's failure under Commonwealth v.
Persinger77 to inform a defendant of the possibility of consecutive sentences during a guilty
plea colloquy and counsel's failure to object to

73

734 A.2d 374 (Pa. 1999).

the plea does not automatically amount to a
"miscarriage of justice" entitling a defendant
to PCRA relief. Rather, a court should look at
the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the plea to determine whether relief is war-

ranted under the PCRA.
Waiver of Trial Counsel
The Superior Court in Commonwealth v.
Owens7 8 held that the defendant was entitled
to PCRA relief where the trial court failed to
inform the defendant in a waiver of trial counsel colloquy of the permissible range of sentences for the crimes charged. As a result, the
court concluded that the defendant's waiver of
trial counsel not knowing and voluntary under
Pa.R.Crim.P. 318.
Constitutionalityof 1995 Amendments to
PCRA
In Commonwealth v. Sanders,79 the Superior Court rejected a claim that the 1995
amendments to the PCRA are null and void
because they allegedly comprise legislation
which exceeded the scope of the Governor's
proclamation of designated subjects to be
addressed during the 1995 Special Session of
the Legislature. The court concluded that the
Legislature's consideration of the PCRA statute
was proper under the parameters of the
Governor's proclamation seeking revisions of
the criminal statutes of the Commonwealth.
The PCRA amendments, the court concluded,
fell squarely within the subject matter designated by the Governor for consideration by the
Legislature. The lack of a specific request by
the Governor for particular legislation did not
render unconstitutional a subsequent enactment of specific legislation where the legislation falls within the ambit of the general subject matter of the Special Session.

74 728 A.2d 890 (Pa. 1999).

75 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988).
7r 732 A.2d 582 (Pa. 1999).
77 615 A.2d 1305 (Pa.1992).

78 - A.2d _ (Pa. Super. _j (Lexis 350).
79 743 A.2d 790 (Pa. Super. 1999).

